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This chapter overviews recent work on the semantics and pragmatics of argu-
ments. In natural languages, arguments are conventionally associated with partic-
ular grammatical constructions, such as:
(1) a. P1, . . . , Pn. Therefore, C;
b. Suppose P1, . . . , Pn. Then, C.
These constructions involve argument words such as ‘therefore’, ‘thus’, ‘so, ‘hence’
and ‘then’ — entailment words (cf. Brasoveanu (2007)) or, as I will call them, fol-
lowing Beaver 2001, pp. 209, argument connectives — which are used in natural
languages to signal the presence of arguments. It is, therefore, natural to study
the speech act of giving an argument by looking at semantics and pragmatics of
argument connectives.1
*I am grateful to Daniel Altshuler and Julian Schloeder for helpful comments on previous
drafts.
1Arguments have been the object of philosophical interest for a long time. Logicians and
philosophers have studied the formal properties of arguments at least since Aristotle and have long
discussed the logical sense of arguments as sets of premises and conclusions (Hamblin (1970),
Walton (1990), Parsons (1996), Rumfitt (2015)). The structure of arguments has been investigated
by epistemologists (e.g., Pollock (1987), Pollock (1991a), Pollock (1991b), Pollock (2010)) and
has given rise to formal argumentation theory, which has developed into a branch of computer
science in its own right (e.g., Dung (1995), Wan et al. (2009), Prakken (2010)). Philosophers of
mind have contemplated the nature of reasoning and inference as mental acts and theorize about
the relation between those mental acts and doxastic states, such as beliefs and credences (e.g.,
Longino (1978), Broome (2013), Boghossian (2014)). By contrast, comparatively less attention
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The first part of the chapter looks at the semantics of argument connectives.
Because arguments typically stretch through discourse, and argument connectives
are kinds of discourse connectives, it is natural to start with semantic approaches
that take discourses rather than sentences to be the main unit of semantic analysis.
Recent developments in linguistics provide ample new resources for a semantics
of argumentation. In particular, I will discuss the resources that discourse coher-
ence approaches as well as dynamic approaches to the study of language have to
understand the semantics of argument connectives. §2 compares argument con-
nectives in English to their formal counterparts in proof theory. §3 explores think-
ing of argument connectives as expressing discourse coherence relations (e.g.,
Asher 1993; Asher and Lascarides 2003; Bras et al. 2001a,b; Le Draoulec and
Bras 2007; Bras et al. 2009; Jasinskaja and Karagjosova 2015). §4 discusses
Grice’s view according to which argument connectives come with an associated
conventional implicature and compares it to the competing analysis on which
‘therefore’ is a presupposition trigger (Pavese 2017; Stokke 2017; Pavese 2021).
§5 discusses Brasoveanu (2007)’s proposal that semantically ‘therefore’ works as
a modal, akin to epistemic ‘must’. §6 examines dynamic analyses of argument
connectives (Pavese 2017; Kocurek and Pavese 2021), with an eye to highlight
the scope and the advantages of these sorts of analyses. The second part of the
chapter (§7) looks at the pragmatics of argument connectives and at the difference
between arguments and explanations. §8 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Consider Argument Schema, with the horizontal line taking a list of premises
and a conclusion into an argument:
has been paid to arguments as a distinctive kind of discourse, with its own semantics and pragmat-
ics. Most work on speech act theory fails to discuss arguments as a kind of speech act (cf. Austin
(1975), ?, Searle and Vanderveken (1985)). Even recent discussions of speech acts tend to focus
primarily on assertions, orders, imperatives, and interrogatives (cf. Fogal et al. (2018)). Some
discussion of argumentation can be found in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1982, 2004), who
investigate arguments and argumentation, but primarily as a tool to overcome dialectical conflict
and in Mercier and Sperber (2011) who use arguments and argumentation theory for a philosoph-
ical theory of reasoning, and in Koralus and Mascarenhas (2013) who draw an interesting parallel
between reasoning as a psychological process and arguments in natural languages and highlight
the question-sensitivity of both. There is some discussion of argument connectives such as ‘there-
fore’ in discourse coherence theory (Hobbs 1985; Asher 1993; Asher and Lascarides 2003; Asher
and Gillies 2003; Kehler 2002; Stojnić ming), though these discussions fall well short of giving a
systematic semantics for ‘therefore’ in all of its uses.
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Argument Schema
φ1 , . . . , φn
ψ
Now, compare Argument Schema to the following arguments in English:
(2) a. There is no on-going epidemic crisis. Therefore, there is no need for
vaccines.
b. It is raining. Therefore, the streets are wet.
c. I am smelling gas in the kitchen. Therefore, there is a gas leak.
d. This substance turns litmus paper red. Therefore, this substance is an
acid.
These arguments all have the form “Φ, Therefore ψ” where Φ is the ordered set
of premises φ1, . . . , φn and ψ is the conclusion. Because of the syntactic resem-
blance of Argument Schema and (2-a)-(2-d), it is tempting to think of ‘therefore’
and other argument connectives such as ‘thus’, ‘so, ‘hence’ and ‘then’ as having
the same meaning as the horizontal line (e.g., Rumfitt 2015, p. 53).
However, Argument Schema is not perfectly translated by the construction
“Φ. Therefore/Thus/Hence/Then ψ”; nor is the horizontal line perfectly translated
by the argument connectives available in English. First of all, the horizontal line




By contrast, ‘therefore’, ‘thus’, ‘so’, ‘hence’, ‘then’, etc. do require explicit
premises:2
2As Pauline Jacobson has pointed out to me (p.c.), the use of ‘so’ strikingly differs from the
use of ‘therefore’ in this regard, in that ‘so’ can also be used without premises, as in “So, you
have arrived!”. On the other hand, ‘so’ can also be used anaphorically, in non-argumentative use,
as when we say ‘I think so’. See Needham (2012) for a discussion of theses uses of ‘so’ and
Krifka (2013), Elswyk (2019) for a more general discussion of propositional anaphora. Hence,
‘so’ seems to have a deictic use as well as an anaphoric use. By contrast, ‘therefore’ seems to
privilege an anaphoric use. (However, see Neta 2013, pp. 399–406 for the claim that ‘therefore’ is
a deictic expression.) For a more careful comparison of the subtle differences between argument
connectives, see Kocurek and Pavese (2021).
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(3) a. ??Therefore/hence, we should leave (looking at one’s partner’s uncom-
fortable face).
b. ??Therefore/hence, the streets are wet (looking at the rain pouring out-
side).
c. ??Therefore/hence, either it is raining or it is not raining.
A plausible explanation for this contrast is that ‘therefore’, ‘thus’, ‘so’, ‘hence’,
and ‘then’ differ from the horizontal line in that they contain an anaphoric element
— (cf. Brasoveanu 2007, p. 296; Kocurek and Pavese (2021)). Like anaphors,
argument connectives require not just an antecedent but its explicit occurrence.3
That is the first difference between ‘therefore’ and the horizontal line. Here
is a second difference (cf. Pavese 2017, pp. 95-6; Pavese (2021)). In Argu-
ment Schema, the premises can be supposed, rather than asserted. By contrast,
‘therefore’ (and ‘hence’, ‘thus’, ‘so’) is not always allowed in the context of a
supposition:
(4) a. It is raining. Therefore/so/hence, the streets are wet.
b. ??Suppose it is raining; therefore/so/hence the streets are wet.
c. If it is raining, therefore/so/hence the streets are wet.
d.???If Mary is English, therefore/so/hence she is brave.
e.???Suppose Mark is an Englishman. Therefore/so/hence, he is brave.
Under supposition, connectives like ‘then’ are much preferred to ‘therefore’:
(5) a. Suppose Φ; then, ψ.
b. Suppose it is raining. Then, the streets are wet.
c. If it is raining, then the streets are wet.
d. If Mary is English, then she is brave.
e. Suppose Mark is an Englishman. Then, he is brave.
For this reason, Pavese (2017) speculates that the slight infelicity of (4-b) may
indicate that ‘therefore’ is more similar to the square — i.e., ‘’ — that ends
proofs than to the horizontal line in Argument Schema:
[Proof of Theorem] Theorem . . .
3There is not to say that premise-less arguments cannot be made in natural languages. Natural
languages seem to resort to other devices to express premise-less arguments, —i.e., locutions such
as ‘by logic’. Cf. Pavese (2021) for a discussion of these issues.
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Just like ‘’, ‘therefore’ would require its premises having been discharged and
not conditionally dependent on other premises.
However, the data is more complex than Pavese (2017) recognizes and should
be assessed with caution. ‘Therefore’ can be licensed in the context of supposi-
tion. For example, consider:
(6) a. If it were raining, the streets would, therefore, be wet.
b. Suppose it were raining; the streets would, therefore, be wet.
c. If Mary were English, she would, therefore, be brave.
d. Suppose Mark were anEnglishman. He would, therefore, be brave.
‘Therefore’ is licensed in this construction, where the mood of the linguistic envi-
ronment is subjunctive. In this respect, ‘therefore’, ‘thus’, ‘so’, and ‘hence’ differ
from ‘then’, for ‘then’ is permitted within the scope of a supposition whether or
not the mood is indicative:4
(7) a. Suppose it were raining. Then, the streets would be wet.
b. If it were raining, then the streets would be wet.
c. If Mary were English, then she would brave.
d. Suppose Mark were an Englishman. Then, he would be brave.
Moreover, ‘therefore’ is at least tolerated with so-called ‘advertising conditionals’
— interrogatives that play a role in discourse similar to that of antecedents of
conditionals:
(8) a. Single? (Then) You have not visited Match.com. (Starr 2014a, pp.
4)
b. Single? Therefore, you have not visited Match.com.
c. Still looking for a good pizzeria? Therefore you have not tried Franco’s
yet.
This suggests that at least under certain conditions, ‘therefore’ can appear in sup-
positional contexts (cf. Pavese (2021)).
Another respect under which argument connectives in English differ from
the horizontal line in Argument Schema is that while their premises have to
be declarative, their conclusion does not need to be.5 Several philosophers have
4Indeed, in these and other respects, ‘then’ and ‘therefore’ seem to be in complementary
distribution. See Kocurek and Pavese (2021) for more discussion of this point.
5I will be assuming throughout that arguments cannot have imperatives or interrogatives as
premises but even here the data is rather subtle. See Kocurek and Pavese (2021) for a detailed
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observed that imperatives can appear as conclusions of arguments (e.g., Parsons
2011, 2013; Charlow 2014; Starr 2020):
(9) If May arrives late tonight, you should go to the store. As a matter of fact,
Mary is arriving late. Therefore, go to the store!
In addition to allowing imperative conclusions, argument connectives can also
have interrogative conclusions:
(10) The doctor and the lawyer were the two main and only suspects. But
then the detective found a stethoscope near the location of the murder.
Therefore, who is the chief suspect now?
The final important observation is that argument connectives in English differ
from the horizontal line in that they can also appear in non-deductive arguments,
both in inductive arguments such as (11-a)-(11-c), in abductive arguments such
as (11-c)(11-d), in causal arguments as in (12-a)-(12-d), as well as practical argu-
ments, such as (12-e):
(11) a. It happened, therefore it can happen again: this is the core of what
we have to say. It can happen, and it can happen everywhere. (from
Primo Levi The Drowned and the Saved, Vintage; New York, 1989.
pg. 199). [INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT]
b. Almost every raven is black, and the animal that we are about to
observe is a raven. Therefore, it will be black too. [INDUCTIVE
ARGUMENT]
c. Mark owns a Bentley. Therefore, he must be rich (Douven et al.
2013) [ABDUCTIVE ARGUMENT]
d. The victim has been killed with a screwdriver. Therefore, it must
have been the carpenter. [ABDUCTIVE ARGUMENT]
(12) a. John pushed Max. Therefore, Max fell. [CAUSAL ARGUMENT]
b. John was desperate for financial reasons. Therefore, he killed him-
self. [CAUSAL ARGUMENT]
c. Mary qualified for the exam. Therefore, she could enroll. [CAUSAL
ARGUMENT]
d. Reviewers are usually people who would have been poets, histo-
rians, biographers, etc., if they could; they have tried their talents
discussion of this point.
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at one or the other, and have failed; therefore they turn into crit-
ics. (Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Lectures on Shakespeare and Mil-
ton) [CAUSAL ARGUMENT]
e. We cannot put the face of a person on a stamp unless said person is
deceased. My suggestion, therefore, is that you drop dead (attributed
to J. Edward Day; letter, never mailed, to a petitioner who wanted
himself portrayed on a postage stamp). (Brasoveanu 2007, p. 279)
[PRACTICAL ARGUMENT]
To sum up, there are at least four dimensions along which argument connectives
differ from the horizontal line in deductive logic. First, they differ in that they
have an anaphoric component; second, they are mood-sensitive, in that whether
they allow embedding under supposition and sub-arguments might depend on the
mood of the linguistic environment. Thirdly, argument connectives can allow for
non-declarative conclusions and, fourthly, they can occur with logical, causal and
practical flavors, as well as in deductive and non-deductive arguments.
3 Argument Connectives within Discourse Coher-
ence Theory
Giving an argument is a speech act that stretches through a discourse — i.e., from
its premises to its conclusion. It is therefore natural to start an analysis of argu-
ments by looking at the resources provided by discourse coherence analysis — an
approach to the study of language and communication that aims at interpreting dis-
courses by uncovering coherence relations between their segments (Asher 1993;
Asher and Lascarides 2003). The crucial question behind a coherence discourse
theoretic approach to the meaning of argument connectives is, then, what kind of
coherence relation they express. The most notable discourse relations studied by
discourse coherence theorists are NARRATION, ELABORATION, BACKGROUND,
CONTINUATION, RESULT, CONTRAST, and EXPLANATION.
Although this literature has focused much more on temporal discourse con-
nectives than on argument connectives, the general tendency in this literature is to
assimilate the meaning of ‘therefore’ to the meaning of ‘then’ in its temporal uses
and to its French counterpart ‘alors’ (cf. Bras et al. 2001a,b, 2009). According to
the prevailing analysis, ‘therefore’ would then introduce the relation of RESULT
(Hobbs 1985; Asher 1993; Asher and Lascarides 2003; Asher and Gillies 2003;
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Kehler 2002).6 If the relation of RESULT is a causal relation: if it holds between
two constituents, then the former causes the latter.
While this account captures well causal uses of ‘therefore’ as in (12-a)-(12-c),
not every use of ‘therefore’ is plausibly causal in this fashion. For example, in
the following arguments, the truth of the premises does not cause the truth of the
conclusion:7
(13) a. All the girls have arrived. Therefore, Mary has also arrived.
b. Mary has arrived. Therefore, somebody has arrived.
c. 2 is even. Therefore either 2 is even or 3 is.
In order to extend their discourse coherence analysis to uses of ‘therefore’ that are
recalcitrant to the causal analysis, Bras et al. 2009, p. 166 proposes we appeal to
INFERENTIAL RESULT — i.e., a relation holding between two events or proposi-
tions just in case the latter is a logical consequence of the former (K indicates a
constituent’s way of describing an event α and the arrow stands for the material
conditional):
INFERENTIAL RESULT (α, β) iff l(KαÑKβ).
However, not every non-narrative use of argument connectives can be analyzed in
terms of INFERENTIAL RESULT. For example, consider the use of ‘therefore’ in
inductive, abductive, or practical arguments, as in (11-c)-(12-e).8 None of these
arguments plausibly express INFERENTIAL RESULT. Even if we restrict INFER-
ENTIAL RESULT to the deductive uses of argument connectives, the problem re-
mains that this approach would result in a rather disunified theory of the meaning
of argument connectives. We are told that sometimes discourses involving ‘there-
fore’ express the causal relation of RESULT, sometimes they express a different
discourse relation altogether — i.e., INFERENTIAL RESULT or classical entail-
ment in deductive uses, and maybe some other discourse relations in practical and
inductive uses.
Here is a unifying proposal, one that preserves the discourse coherence theo-
rists’ important insight that ‘therefore’ is a discourse connector expressing some
6I am grateful to Nick Asher for correspondence here.
7For example, (13-b) violates counterfactual dependence that is plausibly necessary for a
causal relation, for if Mary had not have arrived, somebody might still have arrived. Or con-
sider a mathematical inference, such as (13-c), for which the counterfactual “If 2 were not even, it
would be false that either 2 is even or 3 is” is a useless counterpossible.
8The same problem arises for Stojnić (ming)’s ‘concluding’ discourse relation, which is mod-
eled only to capture deductive arguments.
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or other discourse relation. Suppose we understand the causal relation of RESULT
in terms of a restricted notion of entailment. For example, we might understand
RESULT in terms of nomological entailment — entailment given the laws of na-
ture — or default entailment, as in Asher and Morreau (1990) and Morreau (1992).
(cf. also, Meyer and van der Hoek 1993; Weydert 1995; Veltman 1996). Quite
independently of the consideration of argument connectives, Altshuler (2016) has
proposed that we understand RESULT in terms of enthymematic nomological en-
tailment.9 φ enthymematically entails the proposition ψ, if and only if there is a
nonempty set of propositions Φ such that ΦYtφu logically entails ψ. For exam-
ple, consider again (12-a). While John’s having pushed Max does not entail that
Max fell, Altshuler 2016, pp. 70-1 proposes John’s having pushed Max might en-
thymematically entail that Max fell, for John’s having pushed Max in conjunction
with an appropriate set of background propositions might entail that Max fell.10
Following and extending this proposal, we might then take argument con-
nectives in their inferential deductive uses to express non-restricted forms of en-
tailment — i.e., classical (or relevantist) entailment; by contrast, in their non-
deductive uses (in their inductive and abductive uses), they would instead express
partial entailment (as defined, for example, by Crupi and Tentori (2013)) or prob-
abilistic entailment (as defined, for example, by Jaeger (2005)), and some notion
of practical entailment — entailment given the prudential/practical/moral laws
— in their practical uses. On this proposal, every use of argument connectives
expresses some more or less general relation of entailment. We thereby reach uni-
fication across uses of argument connectives while preserving the differences (cf.
Kocurek and Pavese (2021) for a formal implementation of this unifying idea).
In conclusion, discourse coherence theory provides us with the resources to
study the semantics and pragmatics of arguments from the correct methodological
standpoint: because arguments are discourses, this approach analyzes argument
connectives as discourse connectors and thus as expressing discourse relations.
From our discussion, however, it emerges that argument connectives appear with a
9See also Kehler (2002) (section 3.1).
10When we interpret (12-a), we might assume that in normal circumstances, if one is pushed
sufficiently strongly, then one will fall and that Josh must have pushed Max sufficiently strongly.
As Altshuler (2016) observes, these background propositions may come from a wide variety of
sources, from shared knowledge or from the discourse itself. In the case of RESULT, Altshuler
proposes that we might understand the relation between two constituents as a form of entailment
—i.e., nomological entailment. This discourse relation between a constituent σ1 and a constituent
σ2 holds just in case σ1 entails σ2, together with the relevant laws L as well as the other relevant
background propositions.
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variety of different flavors (narrative, causal, inferential, etc.), and so the question
arises of what unified discourse relation they express. In order to capture what is
common to all of these uses, it seems promising to think of the relevant discourse
relations in terms of more or less restricted relations of entailment.
4 Conventional implicature or presupposition?
In “Logic and Conversation”, Grice 1975, pp.,4–45 uses the case of ‘therefore’
to illustrate the notion of a conventional implicature. Grice observes that in an
argument such as (14-a) and in a sentence such as (14-b), ‘therefore’ contributes
the content that the premise entails the conclusion — in other words, it contributes
Target Content:
(14) a. Jill is English. Therefore, she is brave. (‘therefore’-argument)
b. Jill is English and she is, therefore, brave. (‘therefore’-sentence)
c. Jill is English and she is brave.
d. Her being brave follows from her being English. (Target Content)
Grice points out that in an argument such as (14-a) or in a sentence such as (14-b),
Target Content is communicated without being asserted, for by saying (14-b), one
commits to Target Content’s being true but whether Target Content is true does
not contribute to what is said by (14-b). Grice took this to indicate that Target
Content is only conventionally implicated by ‘therefore’, for he further thought
that (14-b) would not be false if Target Content were false. It is customary for
linguists and philosophers to follow Grice here. For example, Potts (2007) (p.
2) tells us that the content associated with ‘therefore’ is a relatively uncontrover-
sial example of a conventional implicature (see also Neta (2013) and Wayne 2014,
section 2). Whether the conventional implicature analysis of ‘therefore’ best mod-
els the behavior of ‘therefore’ is, however, questionable. Some have argued that
several considerations suggest that the explanatory category of presuppositions,
rather than that of conventional implicatures, might actually better capture the
status of the sort of content that is conveyed by argument connectives (see Pavese
(2017), Stokke (2017), Pavese (2021)).
The first kind of evidence for this claim is that ‘therefore’ satisfies the usual
tests for presupposition triggers: Projectability and Not-At-Issuedness. Start with
Projectability. Like standard presupposition triggers, Target Content projects out
of embeddings — i.e., out of negation (15-a), out of questions (15-b), in the an-
tecedents of conditionals (15-c), out of possibility modals (15-d) and out of ev-
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idential modal and probability adverbs (15-e), as can be seen from the fact that
all of the following sentences still convey that Mary’s braveness follows from her
being English:
(15) a. It is not the case that Mary is English and, therefore, brave. (Nega-
tion)
b. Is Mary English and, therefore, brave? (Question)
c. If Mary is English and, therefore, brave, she will act as such. (An-
tecedent of a conditional)
d. It might be that Mary is English and, therefore, brave. (Possibility
Modal)
e. Presumably Mary is English and therefore brave. (Evidential modal,
probability adverb)
Some speakers also hear a non-projective reading for Negation (15-a). On
this projective reading, we are not simply denying that Mary is English. We are
denying that her braveness follows from her being English. However, the claim
that ‘therefore’ works as a presupposition trigger in (15-a) is compatible with
(15-a) also having a non-projective reading. For example, consider (16):
(16) The tarts were not stolen by the knave: there is no knave.
Clearly, the definite article in ‘the knave’ must have a non-projective reading
in “The tarts were not stolen by the knave,” for else (16) would have to be in-
felicitous. Presumably, whatever explains the non-projective reading in (16) can
explain the non-projective reading in (15-a) (cf. Abrusán (2016)). The standard
explanations for non-projective readings under negation are available here: maybe
we are dealing with two different kinds of negation (metalinguistic negation ver-
sus negation simpliciter (cf. Horn (1972), Horn (1985)); or we might be dealing
with an example of local accommodation (cf. Heim (1983)); or we might appeal
to Bochvar (1939)’s A operator (cf. Beaver (1985), Beaver and Krahmer (2001)).
Hence, Target Content is projectable to the extent to which presuppositions
are usually taken to be projectable. Moreover, Target Content satisfies the sec-
ond standard set of tests for spotting presupposition triggers — i.e., the not-at-
issuedness tests. Target Content also cannot be directly challenged — i.e., (17-a)
and (17-b) — in striking contrast to when it is instead made explicit — i.e., (17-c)-
(17-d):
(17) a. Jill is English and, therefore, she is brave.
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*That is false/That is not true.
b. Jill is English. Therefore, she is brave.
*That is false/That is not true.
c. Jill is English and from that it follows that she is brave.
That is false/That is not true.
d. Jill is English. It follows from that that she is brave.
That is false/That is not true.
e. Jill is English and, therefore, she is brave. Hey, wait a minute! Not
all English people are brave!
f. Jill is English. Therefore, she is brave. What? Not all English
people are brave!
While the Target Content cannot be directly challenged, it can be indirectly
challenged, by taking some distance from the utterance, as evidenced by (17-e)
and (17-f), through locutions such as ‘wait a minute’ and ‘what?’. Note that this
phenomenon is not just observable for inferential uses of ‘therefore’. The same
pattern is observable for narrative uses of ‘therefore’ too:
(18) a. John was desperate for financial reasons. Therefore, he killed him-
self.
b. *That is false/*That is not true. He did not kill himself for financial
reasons.
c. Wait a moment!!! He did not kill himself for financial reasons.
d. What?? He did not kill himself for financial reasons.
That suggests that whether the relation expressed by ‘therefore’ is classical entail-
ment (in inferential uses of ‘therefore’) or some restricted notion of entailment (as
in narrative uses of ’therefore’), such relation is backgrounded in the way presup-
positions are.
Like presuppositions, Target Content also cannot be canceled when unembed-
ded, on pain of Moorean paradoxicality:
(19) a. ??Jill is English. Therefore, she is brave. But her braveness does not
follow from her being English.
b. ??Jill is English. Therefore, she is brave. But I do not believe/know
that her being brave follows from her being English.
And like other strong presupposition triggers, which cannot felicitously follow
retraction (cf, Pearson (2010)), ‘therefore’ cannot follow retraction either, as evi-
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denced by (20-a) and (20-b)
(20) a. ??Well, I do not know if her braveness follows from her being English.
But Mary is English. And therefore, she is brave.
b. ??Well, I do not know if her being from the North follows from her
being progressive. But Mary is a progressive. And therefore, she is
from the North.
Finally, just like presuppositions issued by strong presupposition triggers (Abrusán
(2016)), Target Content cannot even be suspended, as evidenced by (21-c):
(21) ??I have no idea whether all English people are brave. But if Mary is En-
glish and therefore brave, she will act as such.
Do these tests suffice to show that ‘therefore’ is a presupposition trigger? Now,
the boundaries between conventional implicatures and presuppositions are noto-
riously hard to draw. And many supposed examples of conventional implicatures
also satisfy many of the aforementioned tests. However, there are some additional
considerations that suggest that the presuppositional analysis is more explanatory
of the behavior of argument connectives. Conventional implicatures project even
more massively than presuppositions (Potts 2015, p. 31). For example, addi-
tive articles such as ‘too’ and ‘also’ project out of standard plugs such as attitude
reports (cf. Karttunen (1973)). By contrast, the presupposition associated with
‘therefore’ can be plugged by belief reports:
(22) George believes that Mary is English and, therefore, brave. (Belief oper-
ator)
Moreover, under epistemic modals, not-projective readings are sometimes avail-
able for ‘therefore’ (cf. Kocurek and Pavese (2021) for discussion). Moreover,
it seems a necessary condition for presuppositions (as opposed to conventional
implicatures) that a sentence s presupposes p only if s does not warrant an infer-
ence to p when s is in an entailment-canceling environment and when p is locally
entailed (cf Mandelkern (2016)). This condition is satisfied also by discourses fea-
turing ‘therefore’ (cf. Pavese (2021) for discussion). For example, the following
conditionals (23-a) and (23-b) do not entail Target Content:
(23) a. If being brave follows from being English, Mary is English and,
therefore, brave.
b. If liking the Steelers follows from being from Pittsburgh, then Mary
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likes the Steelers and, therefore, she is from Pittsburgh.
In conclusion, the presuppositional analysis seems to capture the projective behav-
ior associated with ‘therefore’ better than the conventional implicature analysis. I
take it, however, that the real interesting question — and the one I will focus on
going forward — is not how to label ‘therefore’ (whether as a presupposition or
as a conventional implicature trigger) but rather how best to formally model its
projective behavior.
5 ‘Therefore’ as a Modal
Another important observation about the meaning of ‘therefore’ is that it closely
resembles that of necessity modals. For example, (24) is very close in meaning to
the modalized conditional (25):
(24) a. Sarah saw a puppy. Therefore, she petted it.
b. If Sarah saw a puppy, she (obviously/necessarily/must have) petted
it.
provided that we add to (24-b) the premise (25):
(25) Sarah saw a puppy.
Moreover, as we have seen in (11-a)–(12-e), ‘therefore’ comes in different flavors
(logical, causal, practical, inductive, abductive). So in this respect too it resembles
modals (cf. Kratzer 1977, 2002). On these bases, following Kratzer’s analysis of
modals, Brasoveanu (2007) proposes we understand different flavors of ‘there-
fore’ as resulting from a restriction of the corresponding ‘modal base’. A modal
base is a variable function from a world to a set of propositions, modeling the na-
ture of the contextual assumptions — whether causal, practical, or epistemic. Its
intersection returns the set of possible words in which all the propositions in the
modal base are true. The logical consequence flavor of ‘therefore’ derives from
an empty modal base, whose intersection is the universe. This formally captures
the fact that logical consequence is the unrestricted flavor of ’therefore’.
While this approach captures both the similarity between ‘therefore’ and ‘must’
and several possible flavors with which ‘therefore’ is used, it is unclear that this
approach resorting to modal bases can effectively model inductive and abductive
uses of ‘therefore’, such as (11-a)-(11-b) (see Kocurek and Pavese (2021) for a de-
velopment of this objection). Inductive arguments are notoriously non-monotonic.
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For example, consider:
(26) a. The sun has risen every day in the past. Therefore, the sun will rise
again tomorrow.
b. The sun has risen every day in the past. And today is the end of the
world. ??Therefore, the sun will rise again tomorrow.
If we apply the modal base approach to (26-a), we get that in any context where
(26-a) is felicitious, (26-b) should be, too. For suppose in our current state s,
when we update s with the premises in (26-a), each world in the resulting state s1
is assigned by the modal base a set of propositions whose intersection supports the
conclusion. Let s2 be the result of updating s with the premises in (26-b). Since
every world in s2 is a world in s1, when we apply the modal base to a world in s2, it
also supports the conclusion. One way Brasoveanu’s approach could be extended
to model the non-monotonicity of inductive arguments could be by appeal to some
context-shift. But it is difficult to see how the sort of context-shifts needed could
be motivated.
This observation does not undermine the important similarity between ‘there-
fore’ and ‘must’ observed by Brasoveanu (2007), for ‘must’ seems to be amenable
to inductive uses too, as in:
(27) All swans observed so far have been white. The next must be white too.
However, it does seem to suggest that a standard way of accounting for different
flavors of modals and argument connectives that appeal to Kratzer (1977)’s modal
bases might not provide a suitable analysis of their inductive and abductive uses.
6 Dynamic Treatments of Argument Connectives
6.1 Simple Semantics
So far, we have observed that argument connectives appear to behave as presuppo-
sition triggers and that they also resembles modals. Any semantic analysis ought
to capture these two sets of data. Pavese (2017), Pavese (2021) suggests that dy-
namic semantics offers the tools to develop an analysis that meets this desiderata.
Kocurek and Pavese (2021) improve on Pavese (2017)’s analysis and develop this
proposal in some detail. Here I review some of the most important aspects of these
dynamic analyses.
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In dynamic semantics, a test is an expression whose role is to check that the
context satisfies certain constraints, as Veltman (1996)’s ‘might’ or
von Fintel and Gillies (2007)’s ‘must’. These expressions check that the context
supports their prejacent: so “It might be raining” checks that the context supports
the sentence that it is raining. Define an INFORMATION STATE as a set s Ď W of
worlds. We define the update effect of a sentence on an information state recur-
sively, as follows:
srps “ tw P s | wppq “ 1u
sr φs “ s´ srφs
srφ^ ψs “ srφsrψs
srφ_ ψs “ srφs Y srψs
srlφs “ tw P s | srφs “ su
sr3φs “ tw P s | srφs ‰ ∅u
srφÑ ψs “ tw P s | srφsrψs “ srφsu.
sr∴ φs “
#
s if srφs “ s
undefined otherwise
In the above definition, l, ˛, Ñ ∴ are all tests. ˛ (corresponding to Veltman
(1996)’s ‘might’) tests whether the context is compatible with its prejacent; if not,
it returns the empty set. l (corresponding to von Fintel and Gillies (2010) and von
Fintel and Gillies (2007)’s ‘must’) tests that the context supports its prejacent —
i.e., that s[φ]=s. If not, it returns the empty set. Notice that ∴ (corresponding to
our ‘therefore’) is similar to ‘l’ — like ‘l’ it checks that the current context (aug-
mented with ‘∴”s antecedents) supports the conclusion. ∴ also closely resembles
Ñ (corresponding to Veltman (1985)’s conditional): the latter tests whether the
context augmented with the antecedent supports the consequent; ‘∴’ tests whether
the context augmented with the premises support the conclusion. One respect in
which discourses containing ‘therefore’ differ from Veltman (1985)’s conditional
is that Veltman (1985) conditionals return the initial context after the test. But
intuitively, an argument updates the context with the premises. For example, an
argument with assertoric premises P after the checking must return the context
updated with P . To see why this must be so, consider:
(28) Paolo is from Turini. Thereforei he is from Piedmontj . And, thereforej
he is from Italy.
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If in (28), ‘thereforei he is from Piedmontj ’ returned the context antecedent to
the update with ‘Paolo is in Turini’, the output context might not support the
proposition that Paolo is from Italy. So we cannot explain why (28) is a good ar-
gument. This observation motivates taking the entry for ∴ to model this feature of
‘therefore’: ∴ takes the current context (already updated with its antecedents) and
returns that context if the test is positive. This explains why successive ‘therefore’
can test the context so updated with the earlier premises (see Kocurek and Pavese
(2021) for a proposal on which the conditional test also returns the context updated
with the antecedents, motivated by the need to model modal subordination).
These entries allow to capture the similarities between necessity modals such
as ‘must’ and ‘necessarily’ and ‘therefore’ that we have observed in the previous
section. On this proposal, one notable difference between ‘therefore’ and ‘must’
that is relevant for our purposes is that if the test fails, the former returns an un-
defined value rather than the empty set. This feature is needed to account for the
different projective behavior of ‘therefore’, ‘must’ and the conditional. Condition-
als and ‘must’ are not plausibly presupposition triggers. ‘must’-sentences, and in
general sentences containing modals, do not need to presuppose that the context
supports their prejacent. Consider:
(29) a. It is not the case that Mark is a progressive and must be from the
North.
b. Is Mark a progressive and must be from the North?
c. If Mark is a progressive and must be from the North, he will not vote
for Trump.
d. It might be that Mark is a progressive and must be from the North.
None of these convey that Mark’s being from the North follows in any way from
him being a progressive. Conditionals also do not project out when embedded in
antecedent:
(30) If Jen gets angry if irritated, you should not mock her.
(30) does not presuppose that Jen will get angry follows from her being irritated.
‘therefore’ seems to differ from other tests such as conditionals and ‘must’, in
that the checking is done by the presupposition triggered by ‘therefore. ‘Therefore’-
discourses are infelicitous if the checking is not positive, like in the case of ‘must’-
sentences and Veltman (1985)’s conditional. But in the case of ‘therefore’, the
infelicity is due to presupposition failure. Because of its behavior as a presuppo-
sition trigger, it is more accurate to give ‘therefore’ a semantic entry similar to the
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one that Beaver 2001, pp., 156–162 assigns to the presuppositional operator ‘δ’:
srδφs “
#
s if srφs “ s
undefined otherwise
Compare l on one hand and δ and ∴ on the other. They only differ in that
the former returns the empty set if the context does not support φ, whereas the
latter returns an undefined value. The difference between these two ‘fail’ values
— undefinedness versus the empty set — is important. A semantic entry that
returns the empty set receives a non-fail value — that of a tautology — under
negation. But in order to account for the projection of the presupposition from a
sentence containing ‘therefore’ to its negation, the negation of that sentence must
also receive a fail value if the sentence does. Choosing ‘undefined’, rather than
the empty set, gives the desired result here — i.e., that the negation of the sentence
containing ‘therefore’ will also be undefined.
This analysis can be illustrated with the following example. Consider:
(31) It’s not the case that Mark is progressive and, therefore, from the North.
 pp^ ∴ nq
Compositionally, we get that the meaning of (31) is the following function:
sr pp^ ∴ nqs “ s´ srp^ ∴ ns
“ s´ srpsr∴ ns
“
#
s´ srps if srpsrns “ srps
undefined otherwise
6.2 Refining the Analysis: Supposition, Parenthetical, and Sub-
arguments
While this analysis might be a good starting point, it is oversimplified in several
ways. One way in which it is oversimplified is that it says nothing about how to
model arguments that have not premises but other arguments as antecedents, such
as conditional proofs:
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(32) Suppose Paolo is from Turin, Then he is from Piedmont. Therefore, if
Paolo is from Turin he is from Piedmont.
Moreover, argumentative discourses seem to have a layered structure: supposi-
tions introduce new states of information, at a different level from categorical
states of information, and suppositions can be embedded to add further levels. For
example, consider:
(33) Paolo is either from Turin or from Madrid. Suppose1, on the one hand,
that he is from Turin. Then1 either he did his PhD there or he did it in
the US. Suppose1.1 he did his PhD in Turin. Then1.1, he studied Umberto
Eco’s work. Suppose1.2 instead he did his PhD in the US. Then1.2 he
studied linguistics. Therefore1, he either did continental philosophy or
philosophy of language. Now on the other hand, suppose2 he is from
Madrid. Then2 he definitely did his PhD in the US. Therefore2, he studied
linguistics. Either way, therefore, he did either continental philosophy or
philosophy of language.
As the indexes indicate, in (33), supposition1 introduces a new layer, over and
above the categorical context where ‘Paolo is either from Turin or from Madrid’.
Moreover, suppositions can be embedded one after the other (as supposition 1
and supposition 1.1) or might be independent (as supposition 1 and supposition
2). ‘therefore’ and ‘then’ might test the context introduced by the most recent
premises or suppositions (as ‘then2’ and ‘therefore2) or refer back to suppositions
introduced earlier (as ‘therefore1’). Finally, after a supposition, parentheticals can
be used to add information to the categorical level and to every level above. For
example, consider:
(34) Suppose Mary went to the grocery store this morning. [Have you been?
It’s a great store with great fruit.] She bought some fruit. Therefore, she
can make a fruit salad.
To model the discourse in (34), we need to be able to exit the suppositional con-
text, update the categorical context, and then return back to that suppositional
context. In (34), however, the information added by the parenthetical to the cate-
gorical content seems to percolate up to the suppositional context too. Ideally, a
theory of argumentative discourse ought to be able to account for these complex-
ities. It seems that in order to model discourses such as (34), we need to refine
Pavese (2017)’s analysis in some important ways.
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Kocurek and Pavese (2021) propose we can model these data by adding struc-
ture both to the syntax of discourses as well as to the contexts used to interpret
them. In order to capture the syntax of argumentative discourses such as the
above, they propose we take discourses not just as sequences of sentences but
rather as sequences of labeled sentences. A labeled sentence is a pair of the form
xn, φy, which we write as n : φ for short (Throughout, we use ∅ to stand for the
empty tuple xy). So parts of discourses are labeled sentences. Here, n is a label,
which is a sequence of numbers (where, for shorthand, we write xn1, . . . , nky as
n1.n2. . . . .nk) that represents which suppositions are active, and φ is a sentence.
Labels enable to keep track of which suppositions are active when and to model
the function of parentheticals of going back to the categorical contexts. So for ex-
ample, the following is a representation of (34) with labeled sentences (where m
= ‘Mary went to the grocery this morning’; g = ‘Have you been? It’s a great store
with great fruit’; b = ‘She bought some fruit’; f = ‘She can make a fruit salad’).
1: m, ∅ : g, 1: b, 1: ∴ f
The second move is to distinguish between the meaning of a sentence and
the meaning of a part of a discourse — or labeled sentence. The meaning of a
sentence is simply its update effect on information states — i.e., a function from
information states to information states, as outlined in §6.1. This semantics would
suffice if argumentative discourse did not have the layered structure we have seen
it does have and if argument connectives did not license different anaphoric re-
lations towards their antecedents. This further information is captured by parts
of discourses or labeled sentences. So, in order to capture suppositional reason-
ing as well as these anaphoric relations, we ought to interpret labeled sentences
as well. While the meaning of sentences is a function from information states to
information states, the meaning of parts of discourses is its update effects on a
context. Instead of modeling contexts as information states, Kocurek and Pavese
(2021) model contexts rather as labeled trees — i.e., a tree where each node is an
information state which is given its own label. Labeled trees contain much more
structure than simple information states. They also contain more structure than
stacks of information states of the sort proposed by Kaufmann (2000) to model
suppositional reasoning. Labeled trees differ from stacks of information states
in that (1) they allow non-linear branching, so that independent suppositions can
be modeled at the same “level” as well as at different levels and (2) can model
anaphoric relations, which will allow us to temporarily exit a suppositional con-
text and later to return to that context. This also allows us to capture the distinctive
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ability of ‘therefore’ to be anaphoric on different suppositional contexts. A CON-
TEXT is a partial function c : Năω Ñ ℘W from labels (i.e., sequences of numbers)
to information states, where:
• ∅ P dompcq (i.e., the categorical state is always defined);
• if xn1, . . . , nk`1y P dompcq, then xn1, . . . , nky P dompcq (i.e., a subsupposi-
tional state is defined only when its parent suppositional state is defined).
The value of a context applied to the empty sequence is the CATEGORICAL
STATE, denoted by c∅. The value of a context applied to a non-empty sequence
is a SUPPOSITIONAL STATE. So for example, n : φ will tell us to update cn with
φ. However, when we introduce a new supposition in a discourse, we don’t sim-
ply update the current information state with that supposition (suppositions are
not just assertions). Rather, we create a new information state updated with that
supposition so that subsequent updates concern this new state as opposed to (say)
the categorical state (Starr 2014a,b). The new supposition effectively copies the
information state of its parent and then updates that state with the supposition.
Formalizing, where n “ xn1, . . . , nk`1y is a label, let n´ “ xn1, . . . , nky (∅´
is undefined). This will allow us to keep track of which information state gets
copied when a new supposition is introduced. For labels n and k, we write n Ď k
just in case n is an initial segment of k and n @ k just in case n is a proper initial
segment of k (i.e., k is “above” n in the labeled tree). Where c is a context, let
c Òn φ be the result of replacing ck with ckrφs for each k P dompcq such that
k Ě n (i.e., c Òn φ updates cn and all information states “above” cn in the tree
with φ). Finally, where s is an information state, let crn ÞÑ ss be just like c except
that cn “ s:






c Òn φ if cn is defined
crn ÞÑ cn´rφss if cn is not defined but cn´ is defined
undefined otherwise
Unpacking this semantic clause: If cn is defined, we update cn and all sub-
sequent states above it with φ. If n “ ∅ (the categorical state), then every state
that’s currently defined is updated with φ. If n “ xn1, . . . , nky, then we only up-
date states assigned to a label that starts with n1, . . . , nk. If cn is undefined, that
means we’re creating a new suppositional state:
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• First, find the state whose label is right below n (so, e.g., if n “ x1y, then
the label right below n is xy, i.e., the label of the categorical state).
• Next, copy the state with that label and assign n to that state. Finally, update
that copied state with φ.
This semantics for parts of discourses can be illustrated by considering two
examples. Under a plausible interpretation, the following discourse is represented
as the following sequence of labeled sentences:
(35) Either it is raining or not. Suppose it’s raining. Then better to take the
umbrella. Suppose it is not raining. Then, taking the umbrella will do no
harm. Therefore, you should take the umbrella.
∅ : pr _ rq, 1: r, 1: ∴ u, 2:  r, 2: ∴ u, ∅ : ∴ u
The dynamics of this discourse can be summarized as follows: First, we up-
date the categorical state swith the trivial disjunction r_ r (so no change). Next,
1: r requires setting c1 “ srrs. Then 1: ∴ u tests srrsrus “ srrs. If it passes, it
returns srrs as c1. Otherwise, the context is undefined. Assuming srrs passes the
test, 2:  r requires defining a new information state c2 “ sr rs. Then 2: ∴ u
tests sr rsrus “ sr rs. If it passes, it returns sr rs as c2. Otherwise, the context
is undefined. Assuming sr rs passes the test, ∴ u tests srus “ s. Since srrs and
sr rs have passed this test, s will, too. Or consider the following example with a
parenthetical:
(36) Suppose Mary went to the grocery store this morning. [Have you been?
It’s a great store.] Then she bought some fruit. Therefore, she can make
a fruit salad.
This is represented as:
1: m, ∅ : g, 1: ∴ b, 1: ∴ f
First, we introduce a suppositional context c1 by copying s and updating it with
srms. Next, ∅ : g updates both the categorical context s and the suppositional
context srms with g. Then 1: ∴ b tests srmsrgsrbs “ srmsrgs. If it passes, it
returns srmsrgs as c1. Otherwise, the context crashes. Likewise for 1: ∴ f .
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6.3 Further Issues
The semantics for argumentative discourses can be extended to model modal
subordination effects as well as subjective arguments (see Kocurek and Pavese
(2021)) though I don’t have space to discuss this application. Let me conclude
this discussion of the semantics of arguments by looking at some further open
issues.
The dynamic analysis of argument connectives presented in the previous two
sections takes argument connectives to be ‘presuppositional’ tests. On this anal-
ysis, a categorical argument is a matter of first asserting the premises and then
drawing a conclusion from the premises, by presupposing that the conclusion fol-
lows from the premises. It might therefore seem as if arguments can never be
informative. However, this conclusion is not correct, for presuppositions can be
informative. Suppose it is not known in the context that Pittsburgh is in Pennsyl-
vania. The presupposition triggered by (37) is most likely to be accommodated in
this context and this accommodation will result in restricting the context set, by
ruling out possibilities where Pittsburgh is located in a state other than Pennsylva-
nia:
(37) John is in Pittsburgh. Therefore, John is in Pennsylvania.
Hence, although the presupposition associated with ‘therefore’ generally works as
a test checking that the context satisfies certain constraints, just like other kinds of
presuppositions, it can sometimes be informative (cf. Pavese (2021) for discussion
of these issues and how they relate to the problem of deduction and Kocurek and
Pavese (2021) for yet a different way to account for informative uses of ‘there-
fore’).
Arguments such as (37) sound weird to common speakers and so do arguments
such as the following:
(38) a. Paris is in France. Therefore, either it is raining in Ecuador now or
it is not.
b. Paris is in France. Therefore, if today is Wednesday then today is
Wednesday.
c. Paris is in France. Therefore, if today is Wednesday, then Paris is in
France.
Because they are all classically valid, and also sound, the current semantics cannot
predict their infelicity. One might blame it on the pragmatics and allege that their
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weirdness has to do with their conclusions not being relevant to the premises. An
alternative thought is, nonetheless, worth exploring. Notoriously, the weirdness
of these patterns of inferences has motivated relevance logic (MacColl (1908);
Belnap (1960); Anderson et al. (2017)). Argument connectives might test for
relevantist, rather than classical, support.
As we have seen in §2, arguments can have non-declarative conclusions too.
These kinds of arguments suggest that drawing a conclusion from certain premises
can be a matter of checking that the context supports the conclusion even if the
conclusion is not declarative.11 Start with arguments with imperative conclusions,
as in “Ψ; therefore, φ!”. If imperatives express propositions, as on a propositional-
ist semantics of imperatives (e.g., Lewis (1972); Aloni (2007); Schwager (2006)),
modeling arguments with imperatival conclusions just amounts to testing that the
context augmented with the premises supports the proposition expressed by the
11It might be helpful to draw again a comparison with epistemic modals like ‘must’ and
‘might’. Although not every use of these epistemic modals in the scope of questions is always
felicitous (cfr. Dorr and Hawthorne (2013)), many have observed that some uses of these modals
are acceptable in questions. For example, Papafragou 2006, p. 1692 observes that the following
exchange is felicitous:
(39) a. If it might rain tomorrow, people should take their umbrella.
b. But may it rain tomorrow?
Along similar lines, Hacquard and Wellwood 2012, p., 7 observe that the following interrogatives
also have a distinctively epistemic interpretation:
(40) a. With the owners and the players on opposite sides philosophically and economi-
cally, what might they talk about at the next bargaining session?
b. Might he be blackballed by all institutions of higher learning?
In this respect, then, ‘therefore,’ ‘hence,’ and ‘so’ resemble standard tests. There is an important
difference between ‘must’ and ‘might’, on one hand, and ‘therefore’, ‘hence’, ‘so’, on the other.
As we have seen, argument connectives can also tolerate imperative conclusions, whereas nei-
ther ‘might’ nor ‘must’ can occur in imperatives (although the reason for this infelicity might be
syntactic):
(41) a. ??Might go to the store!
b. ??Must go to the store!
As Julien Schlöder pointed out to me, “Maybe go to the store” is instead perfectly fine. See
Incurvati and Schlöder (2019) for a helpful discussion of the differences between ‘might’, on one
hand, and ‘maybe’ and ‘perhaps’ on the other. This sentence does have an acceptable reading, on
which ‘must’ receives a deontic interpretation.
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imperative. On an expressivist semantics for imperatives, instead, things are not
so simple and modeling imperatival conclusions requiring thinking of information
states as having more structure than just sets of possible worlds. For example, on
a Starr (2020)’s preference semantics, context ought to be modeled as involving
a set of preferences. On this semantics, testing for support of an imperative by
the context amounts to testing that the preferences expressed by the imperatives
are already in the context. Finally, consider how to model uses of ‘therefore’
that embed interrogatives, such as (10). Kocurek and Pavese (2021) propose we
piggyback on recent dynamic theories, which take the change effect potential of
interrogatives to be that of raising issues. Following Groenendijk et al. (2003) and
Aloni et al. (2007), we can model this idea by thinking of an information state
not as a set of possible worlds, but rather as a partition on possible worlds — i.e.,
as a set of mutually disjoint but jointly exhaustive sets, or cells. An interrogative
might refine the partition by dividing current cells into smaller subsets. So effec-
tively, when using ‘therefore’ with an interrogative conclusion, we are testing that
adding ?φ would not further refine the partition.
7 The Pragmatics of Arguments
So much for the semantics of arguments. Onto the pragmatics. How are we to
model the speech act of giving an argument? To begin, compare the following
two discourses:
(42) a. It is raining. I conclude that the streets are wet.
b. It is raining. Therefore, the streets are wet.
Prima facie, these two discourses are equivalent. The locution “I conclude that...”
seems to mark the speech act of concluding. It is tempting, then, to assimilate the
meaning of ‘therefore’ to the meaning of ‘I conclude that...”.12 On this analysis,
argument connectives such as ‘therefore’ work as a speech act modifier — taking
pairs of sentence types, into a distinctive kind of speech act — i.e., the speech act
of giving an argument for a certain conclusion.13
12On several differences between ‘therefore’ and ‘I conclude that...”, see Kocurek and Pavese
(2021).
13For example, some take epistemic modals such as “might” to be speech act modifiers in that
they ‘modulate’ assertoric force. See for example, Westmoreland (1998) and Yalcin 2005, p. 251.
Others argue that intonation is a speech act modifier. See Heim et al. (2016).
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This analysis, though tempting, should be resisted since argument connectives
are not always used to make arguments. Consider again (43-a)-(43-d) from §2:
(43) a. John pushed Max. Therefore, Max fell.
b. John was desperate for financial reasons. Therefore, he killed him-
self.
c. Mary qualified for the exam. Therefore, she enrolled.
d. Max passed his A-levels. Therefore, he could go to the university.
While superficially, these discourses have the same form of an argument, they can
be used to make other speech acts too. For example, one may utter, say, (43-a)
without arguing for the conclusion that Max fell. In fact, the most common use of
(43-a) is simply to explain what happened when John pushed Max (suppose (43-a)
is used in the process of reporting what happened yesterday). In this use, the dis-
course does not necessarily have argumentative force. Rather, it uses ‘therefore’
narratively or explanatorily. Similarly for (43-b). Arguments and explanations
are different kinds of speech acts. That can be seen simply by observing that
while an explanation might presuppose the truth of its explanandum, an argument
cannot presuppose the truth of its conclusion, on pain of being question-begging.
For example, one might use (43-a) in the course of an explanation of how Max
fell, in a context where it is already common ground that Max fell. As used in this
explanation, (43-a) is not the same as an argument.
It is also tempting to think that the causal uses are explanatory and not argu-
mentative whereas the logical uses are argumentative but not explanatory. How-
ever, this cannot be correct, as there are causal and yet argumentative uses of
‘therefore’. For example, consider TRIAL:
TRIAL In a trial where John is accused of murdering his wife, the prosecutor
argues for his conviction, as follows:
(44) John was financially desperate, ruthless, and knew about his wife’s
savings. Therefore, he killed his wife to get her money.
The discourse (44) in TRIAL can undeniably be used in an argument — for ex-
ample, an argument aiming to convince the jury of the fact that John has killed
his wife. And yet the relation expressed by this use of ‘therefore’ is causal, if
anything is.
There are also deductive uses of ‘therefore’ in explanations. For example,
consider the following (Hempel (1962), Railton (1978)):
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1 Whenever knees impact tables on which an inkwell sits and further conditions
K are met (where K specifies that the impact is sufficiently forceful, etc.),
the inkwell will tip over. (Reference to K is necessary since the impact of
knees on table with inkwells does not always result in tipping.)
2 My knee impacted a table on which an inkwell sits and further conditions K are
met.
Explanandum Therefore, the inkwell tipped over.
In this explanation of why the inkwell tipped over, that the inkwell tipped over
deductively follows from the premises. In this sense, there are logical uses of
‘therefore’ in explanations too.
The conclusion is that the distinction between argumentative uses of ‘there-
fore’ and explanatory uses of ‘therefore’ cuts across the distinction between causal
and logical meaning of ‘therefore’. How are we to capture this distinction between
argumentative uses of ‘therefore’ and explanatory uses of ‘therefore’? This dis-
tinction might have to be captured not at the level of the semantics of arguments
but rather at the level of the pragmatics of arguments. Chierchia and McConnell-
Ginet (2000) have introduced an important distinction (then defended and elabo-
rated by Murray and Starr (2018a) and Murray and Starr (2018b)) between CON-
VENTIONAL FORCE and UTTERANCE FORCE. The CONVENTIONAL FORCE of a
sentence type consists in the distinctive ways different sentence types are used to
change the context — e.g., declaratives are used to change the common ground,
by adding a proposition to the common ground (Stalnaker (1978)); interroga-
tives affect the questions under discussion (e.g., Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982),
Roberts (1996)) and imperatives the to do list (e.g., Portner (2004), Portner (2007),
Starr (2020), Roberts (1996)). UTTERANCE FORCE, by contrast, consists in the
distinctive ways utterance types change the context. This is the total force of an
utterance, while the conventional force is the way a sentence’s meaning constrains
utterance force. Crucially, as Murray and Starr (2018b) argue, conventional force
underdetermines utterance force. For example, assertions are conventionally as-
sociated with declarative sentences. However, declarative sentences can also be
used to make conjectures, to lie, to pretend, etc. So, while the conventional force
of a speech act is conventionalized and can be modeled by looking at its invariant
conversational effects on a public scoreboard, the utterance force of a speech act
might vary depending on the effects of the speech act on the private mental states
of the participants to the conversations as well as on the mental state of the utterer.
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Suppose we apply this distinction between conventional force and utterance
force to the case of argument connectives and discourses that feature them. The
proposal then is that across all of its uses — causal, explanatory, as well as prac-
tical, inductive, deductive — argument connectives have the same conventional
force. As we have seen, following Kocurek and Pavese (2021), the core meaning
of argument connectives might be dynamic across the board: all uses of ‘there-
fore’ express that the premises in the context (logically, causally, nomologically,
probabilistically) support the conclusion. However, in addition to argument con-
nectives’ having this dynamic meaning, uses of discourses with argument connec-
tives come with a distinctive utterance force — in some cases with the force of
an argument, in others with the force of an explanation. If that is correct, then
the distinctive force of arguing versus explaining can be recovered at the level of
argument connectives’ utterance force.
8 Conclusions
This chapter has overviewed recent studies on the semantics and pragmatics of
arguments. From this discussion several issues emerge for further research. These
include: How are we to think of the syntax of argumentative discourses and how
are we to model contexts in order to model the dynamics of argumentative dis-
courses? What consequences does the presuppositional nature of ‘therefore’ have
on how to think of arguments? What is the nature of the support relation tested
by argument connectives? What makes a discourse an argument, rather than an
explanation? At which level of linguistic analysis lies the difference between ar-
guments and explanations? How are we to characterize the utterance force distinc-
tive of arguments? Are there such things as zero-premises arguments in natural
languages? How do deductive arguments in natural language differ, if at all, from
proofs in natural deduction systems — such as Fitch’s proofs? Although many
issues pertaining the semantics and pragmatics of argumentation are left open for
further research, I hope to have made a plausible case that they deserve attention
since foundational questions concerning the nature of context and discourse, as
well as their dynamics, turn on them.
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